, where the simplified studied hash function, based only on the quasigroup of modular subtraction, was successfully cryptanalysed. In this paper we show how to construct collisions, 2nd preimages, and also preimages for the full hash function based on isotopy of quasigroups.
Introduction
Hash functions are well known in computer science and play an important role in modern cryptography. They transform an input string of arbitrary length onto the fixed length output string, called also the hash. (2) The hash function must be one way in the sense that given y in the image of h, it is "hard" to find a message x such that h(x) = y (preimage resistant) and given x in the domain of h it is "hard" to find a message x = x such that h(x ) = h(x) (second preimage resistant).
According to the number of inputs one can subdivide the hash functions into the two classes: keyed, and unkeyed, respectively. Hash functions that use a single input, a message to be hashed, are called unkeyed, or Manipulation Detection Codes (MDCs), sometimes also cryptographic hash functions or just only hash functions. On the other hand, hash functions with a message to be hashed and a key being their inputs are called Message Authentication Codes (MACs).
, for which it is "hard" to find two distinct messages x, x , such that h(x) = h(x ).
The usage of quasigroups (resp. latin squares) in cryptography is not very common. In spite of that various cryptosystems based on quasigroups appeared in past few years, e.g., see [6] , where it is shown that the usage of quasigroups in the design of S-boxes might open new ways in the design of block ciphers. Quasigruops were also used in the design of hash functions [2] , [3] and the cryptanalysis of these designs is the main focus of this paper. Some recent designs using quasigroups are, e.g., the stream cipher Edon80 [4] and the hash function Edon-R [5] .
called a finite quasigroup of order n if any two elements a, b ∈ Q are given, the equations a * x = b and y * a = b have exactly one solution. Thus the Caley table of a finite quasigroup of order n is a latin square, i.e., an n × n array with the property that each row and each column contains a permutation of symbols from Q. ·) and (G 2 , * ) be two finite quasigroups. An ordered triple (θ, ϕ, ψ) of one-to-one mappings of the set G 1 onto the set G 2 is called an isotopism of (
Then the quasigroups (G 1 , ·) and (G 2 , * ) are said to be isotopic. 
Description of the studied hash function
where m i ∈ Q, 1 ≤ i ≤ k and a is a given element from Q, that plays the role of an initialization vector.
CRYPTANALYSIS OF A HASH FUNCTION BASED ON ISOTOPY OF QUASIGROUPS
Example. Let Q = {0, 1, 2, 3} and the operation , defined on Q, be given by Table 1 . Let a = 1 and the message to be hashed be (1, 0, 3, 1) . Then the hash is calculated as follows: The usage of a general quasigroup would result in the necessity to store the whole Caley table of the quasigroup operation. If we assume a hash length to be 18 bits, then the quasigroup would contain 2 18 elements and the storage requirements for the Caley table would exceed 1 TB (18.2 18 .2 18 ). Recall that the nowadays used hash length is about 160-512 bits. To overcome this problem, a special quasigroup, namely the quasigroup of modular subtraction, was proposed in [2] , [3] to be used. The operation ⊗, defined on Q, is then given as
The usage of the "easy to evaluate" expression for the definition of the operation ⊗ allows us to use quasigroups with a very large number of elements without the necessity to store the Caley tables. However, the usage of the quasigroup of modular subtraction as the only operation for the hash function is insecure, as was shown in [9] . That is why the authors in [2] , [3] suggest to use quasigroups isotopic with the quasigroup of modular subtraction.
Ò Ø ÓÒ 6º Let (Q,⊗), Q = n, be the quasigroup of modular subtraction.
Let θ, ϕ a ψ −1 be given permutations that define isotopy of (Q, ·) with (Q, ⊗). The quasigroup operation in (Q, ·) can be written as
In the following we present the algorithms P 1(), P 2(), and P 3() for the mappings θ, ϕ, and ψ −1 , respectively. Note that there was only the algorithm P 1() specified in [2] , [3] , the remaining algorithms P 2(), and P 3() were obtained from [7] . The algorithms are given in C++ language with NTL (Number Theory Library) data types. , that is isotopic with (Q, ⊗), is given in Table 3 .
Let a = 1 and (1, 0, 3, 1) be the message to be hashed. The hash value is then calculated as follows:
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Attack on the hash function
Second preimage resistance is one of the crucial requirements a cryptographic hash function must meet. In the following, we show how to find a message that has the same hash value as another given message.
Let a ∈ Q be a given known parameter of the hash function and (m 1 , m 2 , . . .
The false message can be created by adding a prefix or suffix to the given message, or moreover, one can create a totally new message, that is independent on the given one [9] .
Creating a false message by adding a prefix/suffix to the given message
The false message created from the original one by adding a prefix can be written as (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p l , m 1 , m 2 
A false message can be created by adding a suffix to the original message as well. In this case the false message can be written as (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k , s 1 , s 2 
Note that only the last element of the last added/changed part of the message has to be chosen in a proper way. All the other elements can be chosen arbitrarily, i.e., they can represent meaningful data. (In general, the element that should be chosen in proper way could be at any position in the message and not only be the last one. However, the non-associativity of a quasigroup would make difficult to find this element.) Let a = . . . ((a · p 1 ) · p 2 ) · . . . and d = . . . ((d · s 1 ) · s 2 ) · . . . . Then one has to find such p l and s t , so that it would hold a · p l = a, and d · s t = d, respectively.
Creating a new (false) message
Let us create a message ( x 1 , x 2 
The task of the attacker is to find such
Moreover, we can find the last element of the prefix/suffix added to the original message (see Section 3.1) in a similar way:
As we can see, the problem of finding the proper element is in finding the permutations ϕ −1 , and ψ, respectively. The permutation θ need not be inverted. It can be also seen that the complexity of creating a false message by adding a prefix/suffix to a given message or creating a new false message is the same. The parameter a has no influence on the difficulty of creating a false message.
Inverting the mappings θ, ϕ, and ψ

−1
In general, inverting a permutation could be a difficult problem. After an initial inspection of the ϕ mapping we observed that it is not a permutation! Some examples confirming this statement are shown in the Table 4 . Concerning the Definition 4, it is a significant problem, because the mappings θ, ϕ, and ψ Table 5 . Substituting these values into the previously mentioned equations we obtain 0 · x = 3,
Then the solutions are x = 0, or x = 1, and y = 0 (see Table 5 ), that is in contradiction with the Definition 3.
ÓÖÓÐÐ ÖÝ 1º (Q, ·) is not a finite quasigroup and the Caley table of (Q, ·) is not a latin square.
Although the mapping ϕ is not a permutation, computing a hash value is possible. We demonstrate it on the following example. , 0] be generated by the methods P1, P2, and P3, respectively, stated in Section 2. The Caley table of (Q, ·) is given in Table 5 . Let a = 0 and (2, 1, 1, 3) be the message to be hashed. The hash value can be computed as follows:
Let us create a new (false) message with the same hash value d = 3. Let this message be (0, 2, 3,
Hence, it must hold d · x v = d, i.e., 0 · x v = 3. x v can be calculated as follows:
However, in this case, one has to invert the mappings ϕ and ψ −1 to obtain x v . The algorithms for the inverse mappings to θ, ϕ, and ψ −1 are stated below in C++ language with NTL data types.
Algorithm for the mapping ψ
The algorithm for the mapping ψ −1 is very simple (see Section 2) and finding the inverse mapping was easy. The main problem concerning the ϕ mapping is that it is not a permutation. We will deal only with Q = 2k, k ∈ N. Recall that the number of elements in the quasigroup is calculated from the bit length of the hash value, thus the number of elements in Q is, in fact, a power of 2. Some specific features of the ϕ mapping are shown in the Table 6 . Table 4 . Except the elements 1 and n − 1, it is possible to invert the mapping ϕ uniquely. The algorithm for calculating ϕ −1 is stated below in the C++ language using the NTL library. 
Remark 1º Note that the previously described construction of false messages (2nd preimages) can be used to construct collisions and preimages in a similar way as well. 
ÓÖÓÐÐ ÖÝ 2º
Conclusions
We described the cryptanalysed hash function, that was proposed in [2] , [3] . The studied hash function uses a quasigroup isotopic to the quasigroup of modular subtraction. This paper enhances the paper [9] , where the simplified studied hash function, based only on the quasigruop of modular subtraction, was successfully cryptanalysed. We have found a significant problem concerning the mapping ϕ that is one of the mappings defining the isotopy. It is not a permutation what contradicts the design ideas. Moreover, we have presented the construction of false messages (collisions, 2nd preimages, and also preimages) for the hash function H a . The attack is based on inverting the mappings defining the isotopy.
It still remains an open question whether such a construction of a hash function is secure if "hard-to-invert" mappings are used for the isotopy. The structure of the underlying quasigroup of modular subtraction could be useful in the attack.
